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Abstract
We show that the full version of the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem’ generalizes
to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem
have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result
by showing that when agents’ preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of
weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to
hold.
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1 Introduction
We study two-sided matching problems. ‘Stability’ of outcomes in these problems is
considered to be the main property that accounts for the success of matching rules. We
identify a large and maximal preference domain for which ‘underdemanded’ institutions
(or agents) have the same partners at each stable outcome. Consequently, no stable
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rule can implement possibly desirable changes in the set of partners assigned to such
institutions.
Our study is motivated by issues raised in certain centralized labor markets. As an
illustration, many countries employ each year a centralized mechanism to assign newly
graduated medical students to positions in residency programs. Hospitals in rural areas
are typically less preferred than those in urban areas by medical graduates, i.e., they are
ranked below urban hospitals in a typical student’s preference list. Also, graduates from
relatively successful programs are more popular among hospitals, i.e., they are ranked
above other students in a typical hospital’s preference list. Rural hospitals complain
that their positions may not be filled by the stable matching rule in use and that they
may not be assigned popular graduates. The ‘rural hospital theorem’ established in
several matching models states that the number of medical graduates assigned to a
hospital and the set of graduates assigned to a hospital in a rural area do not vary
across stable outcomes. Even though the theorem’s name is a useful reminder of its
content and origin, the ‘rural hospital theorem’ equally applies to other labor markets
with similar concerns about the numerical distribution of workers or the composition
of the workforce of firms.
We study the ‘rural hospital theorem’ in the context of many-to-many labor markets,
i.e., markets where each agent can engage in multiple partnerships. There are several
reasons to focus on many-to-many markets instead of many-to-one markets (where
each worker can be employed by at most one firm). First, a well-known many-to-
many market is the medical labor market in the UK. More specifically, each medical
graduate in the UK has to seek two positions (a medical position and a surgical position)
to be able to register as a medical doctor. Shallcross (2005) mentioned concerns of
doctor shortages in rural areas in the UK. Second, as pointed out by Echenique and
Oviedo (2006), even if in a labor market most workers are employed by one firm,
the presence of a few workers with multiple employers can make a crucial difference.
Precisely, Echenique and Oviedo (2006, Example 2.2) showed that the presence of only
one worker with two part-time jobs can already change the stable outcome for all other
agents. Thus, the functioning of even ‘almost many-to-one’ labor markets can only be
understood through the study of many-to-many matching models. Third, the literature
on many-to-many matching markets has grown in the last couple of years,1 but there
is still a wide gap with respect to many-to-one markets. Fourth, there are important
structural differences between many-to-one and many-to-many matching markets, even
if all agents have so-called ‘responsive’ preferences. For instance, Sotomayor (1999)
showed that unlike many-to-one markets, in many-to-many markets the set of stable
outcomes needs not coincide with the core. Finally, our results are not only novel to the
many-to-many framework. Indeed, the restriction of all our results to the many-to-one
framework yields new results and subsumes existing results for that framework as well.2
Next, we describe in more detail the model we study, the existing literature, and our
contribution. In a two-sided many-to-many matching problem there are two disjoint
1Recent papers on many-to-many matching include, among others, Hatfield and Kominers
(2012a,b), Jaramillo et al. (2014), Klaus and Walzl (2009), Kojima and U¨nver (2008), Kominers
(2012), Konishi and U¨nver (2006), Ostrovsky (2008), Sotomayor (2004), and Yazıcı (2012).
2See the discussion that precedes Theorem 3 and Remarks 7 and 8.
2
sets of agents, which we call ‘firms’ and ‘workers.’ Each firm (worker) can only form
partnerships with workers (firms). Each agent has a preference order over the set of all
subsets of partnerships, i.e., subsets of agents in the other set. For each agent, there is a
maximal number (‘quota’) of partnerships the agent can or is willing to be involved in.
An outcome of the problem is a ‘match’ which consists of a collection of partnerships.
A match is ‘stable’ if no agent prefers to be matched to a proper subset of its current
partners, and no set of firms and workers prefer to establish new partnerships only
among themselves and possibly break up some existing partnerships.3 This definition
is more stringent than so-called pairwise stability which is another standard solution
concept but that only eliminates blocking by firm-worker pairs. Stability proved to be a
crucial property in many entry-level labor markets where workers are matched to firms
through a clearinghouse. It has been observed that clearinghouses that use stable rules
often perform better than those that use rules that do not necessarily produce stable
matches.4 According to Roth (1991, p.422) even the weaker stability concept, pairwise
stability, can be of primary importance for many-to-many markets as well.
There are many-to-many problems for which no stable match exists. Certain as-
sumptions on preferences have been identified to guarantee that they do. A firm’s
preferences are ‘substitutable’ if whenever a worker is chosen from a group of workers
by this firm, she is also chosen from any of the group’s subsets to which she belongs.5
Substitutability of workers’ preferences is defined similarly. Substitutability is a stan-
dard assumption in the literature and it guarantees the existence of a pairwise stable
match.6 Hatfield and Kominers (2012a) showed that for substitutable preferences, sta-
bility and pairwise stability are equivalent.7 Thus, when preferences are substitutable,
the set of stable matches is non-empty and coincides with the set of pairwise stable
matches. With the important exception of Proposition 1, we assume substitutability
throughout.
Taking the requirement of stability as granted, an important question is whether
the choice of a particular stable rule affects the numerical distribution of workers; and
if not, whether different matches assign different sets of workers to a firm that does not
fill all its positions. For instance, in the context of the assignment of medical graduates
in the US, the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) failed to fill the posts of
many hospitals in (typically less preferred) rural areas (Sudarshan and Zisook, 1981).
However, provided that the preferences satisfy certain conditions, the problem of the
rural hospitals cannot be attributed to the particular stable rule used by the NRMP.
Indeed, the results obtained by Gale and Sotomayor (1985) and Roth (1984b, 1986)
suggest that any other stable rule would yield (R1) the same numerical distribution
of medical graduates and would assign (R2) the same medical graduates to each rural
3This is an adaptation of the stability definition in Hatfield and Kominers (2012a).
4See, for instance, Roth (1991).
5Substitutability is an adaptation of the gross substitutability property (Kelso and Crawford, 1982)
by Roth (1984a) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990) to matching problems without monetary transfers.
6The existence of a pairwise stable match can be shown via an algorithm for strict preferences
(Roth, 1984a) and via a non-constructive proof for non-necessarily strict preferences (Sotomayor,
1999). See also Mart´ınez et al. (2004b) for the computation of the full set of pairwise stable matches.
7We are thankful to a referee for pointing this out.
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hospital that does not fill all its posts. The two results are known as weak and strong
versions of the rural hospital theorem.8
Both versions of the rural hospital theorem play a functional role in proving many
appealing results. For instance, R1 is used to show the lattice structure of the set
of stable matches (Mart´ınez et al., 2001) and the group strategy-proofness (for the
workers’ side) of the worker-optimal stable rule (Mart´ınez et al., 2004a) in a many-to-
one model. Ma (2002) studied refinements of Nash equilibrium based on ‘truncations
at the match point’ for the preference revelation game induced by any stable rule. He
used R2 to prove that each equilibrium outcome is stable for the true preferences. Pais
(2006) studied ordinal Nash equilibria of the preference revelation game induced by any
probabilistic stable rule. She used R2 to show that any equilibrium induces a match
that is individually rational for the true preferences. Yazıcı (2012) also employed R2
to extend the latter result to many-to-many matching with a more general preference
domain. These results show that the relevance of the rural hospital theorem goes
beyond its direct interpretation: it is a powerful tool in establishing structural results
and analyzing strategic matching games.
The first papers on the rural hospital theorem (e.g., Gale and Sotomayor, 1985;
Roth, 1984b, 1986) studied many-to-one matching problems and assumed firms’ pref-
erences to be ‘responsive.’ A firm’s preferences over groups of workers are responsive
to its preferences over individual workers if (i) for two groups that only differ in one
worker, the firm prefers the one with the preferred worker, and (ii) adding an acceptable
(unacceptable) worker to a group that does not fill its quota makes the group better
(worse). Responsiveness implies substitutability. Several papers have shown R1 and
R2 for preference domains that are strictly larger than the domain of responsive pref-
erences.9 A firm’s preferences are ‘separable’ if condition (ii) above holds. R1 and R2
hold for substitutable and separable preferences (Mart´ınez et al., 2000, Proposition 2).
Since responsiveness implies separability, Mart´ınez et al.’s (2000) result subsumes the
previous rural hospital theorem results.10
Concerning the many-to-many framework, Alkan (2002, Proposition 6) showed that
R1 holds for substitutable and ‘cardinally monotonic’ preferences. A firm’s preferences
over groups of workers are cardinally monotonic if whenever the group of workers avail-
able to the firm expands, it will not employ fewer workers.11 Since separability implies
cardinal monotonicity, Alkan’s (2002, Proposition 6) many-to-many result subsumes
Mart´ınez et al.’s (2000, Proposition 2a) many-to-one result on R1. On the other hand,
R2 has only been shown to hold for responsive preferences (Alkan, 1999, Proposition 2i)
and for so-called ‘quota-filling’ preferences that satisfy separability (Alkan, 2001, Corol-
lary 1). The latter two results on R2 do not subsume Mart´ınez et al.’s (2000, Proposi-
8Since R2 implies R1, R1 (R2) is often referred to as the weak (strong) rural hospital theorem.
9For the reader’s convenience, we refer to the Venn diagram of Figure 1 (in Section 3) which depicts
the inclusion relations among the preference domains we discuss.
10Kojima (2012) also introduced the domain of separable preferences with so-called affirmative
action constraints. This domain is a strict superset of the domain of separable preferences but a strict
subset of the domain of cardinally monotonic preferences. Kojima (2012) showed that on his domain
an appropriately adjusted version of R2 holds.
11Cardinal monotonicity is called size monotonicity and law of aggregate demand in Alkan and
Demange (2003) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), respectively.
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tion 2b) many-to-one result on R2.
The contribution of our paper is twofold. We first introduce a new preference
domain called weak separability by relaxing separability. We prove that the strong rural
hospital theorem, i.e., R2, holds on the domain of substitutable and weakly separable
preferences (Theorem 3). Thus, our result generalizes the results of Mart´ınez et al.
(2000, Proposition 2b) for many-to-one matching and Alkan (1999, Proposition 2i and
2001, Corollary 1) for many-to-many matching. Our short proof is based on a strong
structural result regarding the set of stable matches due to Roth (1984a).
Our second contribution shows that the two largest domains for R1 and R2 discussed
above are in fact maximal (in a sense made precise below). First, we provide a maximal
domain result that complements Alkan’s (2002, Proposition 6) result regarding R1 and
cardinal monotonicity. Precisely, if some agent’s preferences do not satisfy cardinal
monotonicity then we construct substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences for
the other agents such that R1 fails (Proposition 1). Second, we provide a maximal
domain result that complements our Theorem 3 regarding R2 and weak separability.
Precisely, if some agent has substitutable preferences that are not weakly separable then
we construct substitutable and weakly separable preferences for the other agents such
that R2 fails (Proposition 2). In fact, our two maximality results are stronger in two
ways: 1) the constructed preferences are responsive and 2) the proofs are also effective
for the many-to-one framework (and yield novel results in that framework as well).
Concerning many-to-one matching with contracts, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005, The-
orems 8 and 9) proved R1 for substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences and
established a maximality result. Hatfield and Kojima (2010) introduced a weaker condi-
tion than substitutability called bilateral substitutability.12 Hatfield and Kojima (2010,
Theorem 6) extended R1 to bilaterally substitutable and cardinally monotonic prefer-
ences for many-to-one matching with contracts. Hatfield and Kominers (2012a) studied
many-to-many matching with contracts where multiple contracts can be signed between
any firm-worker pair. Hatfield and Kominers (2012a, Section 4.2) also obtained R1 for
substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences. In matching without contracts,
substitutability and bilateral substitutability are equivalent. Thus, in that framework,
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005, Theorem 9), Hatfield and Kojima (2010, Theorem 6), and
Hatfield and Kominers (2012a, Section 4.2) boil down to the earlier mentioned result
of Alkan (2002, Proposition 6) for many-to-one and many-to-many matching. In Re-
mark 8 we show that in the framework without contracts, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005,
Theorem 9) does not imply nor is implied by our Proposition 1.
Hatfield and Kominers (2012b) studied matching in networks with bilateral con-
tracts: agents trade goods via contracts and each agent may be both a seller and a
buyer of a good. Their Theorem 8 shows that a ‘generalized version of R1’ holds if
preferences satisfy ‘same-side and cross-side substitutability’ and two laws of aggregate
demand and supply. In terms of two-sided many-to-many matching without contracts,
their result boils down to Alkan (2002, Proposition 6). Hatfield and Kominers (2012b,
Theorem 9) also proved a maximality result similar to Proposition 1. More precisely, if
12Consider a firm that faces a set of contracts Y and two contracts x and z. Substitutability requires
that if x is chosen in Y ∪{x, z} then x is still chosen in Y ∪{x}. Bilateral substitutability only requires
the same property for contracts x and z whose associated workers are not involved in contracts in Y .
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some agent’s preferences violate the law of aggregate demand or supply but do satisfy
same-side and cross-side substitutability, then there are same-side and cross-side sub-
stitutable preferences for the other agents satisfying the laws of aggregate demand and
supply such that the generalized version of R1 fails. In Remark 8 we show that in terms
of two-sided many-to-many matching without contracts Hatfield and Kominers (2012b,
Theorem 9) does not imply our Proposition 1.
In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we formally introduce and relate
the aforementioned preference domains. In Section 4, we state and prove our results on
the rural hospital theorem.
2 Model
There are two disjoint and finite sets of agents: a set of firms F and a set of workersW .
Let A = F ∪W denote the set of agents. Generic elements of F , W , and A are denoted
by f , w, and a, respectively. The set of (possible) partners of agent a is Sa ≡ W if
a ∈ F , and Sa ≡ F if a ∈ W . The preferences of agent a are given by a linear order Pa
over 2Sa.13 Let Pa denote the collection of all possible preferences for a. Since we fix the
set of agents, a many-to-many matching market is given by a preference profile,
i.e., a tuple P = (Pa)a∈A. For each a ∈ A, let Ra denote the ‘at least as desirable as’
relation associated with Pa, i.e., for each pair b, c ∈ Sa, bRa c if and only if b = c or
b Pa c. For each agent a with preferences Pa, let Ch(., Pa) be the induced choice function
on 2Sa . In other words, for each S ⊆ Sa, Ch(S,Pa) is agent a’s most preferred subset
of S according to Pa. One easily verifies that Ch satisfies consistency (Alkan, 2002),
14
i.e., for each pair S, T ⊆ Sa,
Ch(S, Pa) ⊆ T ⊆ S =⇒ Ch(T, Pa) = Ch(S, Pa). (1)
A set of agents S ⊆ Sa is acceptable to agent a at P if S Ra ∅. For each agent a ∈ A,
let its ‘quota’ be the smallest integer qa ≥ 0 such that for each S ⊆ Sa with |S| > qa,
S is not acceptable to a.15 If each agent on (at least) one side of the market has quota
at most 1, then the market is many-to-one. If all agents have quota at most 1, then
the market is one-to-one.
A match µ is a mapping from A into 2F ∪ 2W such that for each pair a, a′ ∈ A,
µ(a) ∈ 2Sa and [a ∈ µ(a′) ⇔ a′ ∈ µ(a)]. Let M denote the set of all matches.
Next, we adapt the definition of stability due to Hatfield and Kominers (2012a, Sec-
tion 2.2) to our model. Match µ is blocked by an agent a ∈ A at P if Ch(µ(a), Pa) 6=
µ(a). Match µ is blocked by a set of firms and workers F ′ ∪ W ′ at P , where
∅ 6= F ′ ⊆ F and ∅ 6=W ′ ⊆W , if there is a match µ′ such that for each a ∈ F ′ ∪W ′,
(b1). ∅ 6= (µ′(a)\µ(a)) ⊆ F ′ ∪W ′;
(b2). µ′(a) ⊆ Ch(µ′(a) ∪ µ(a), Pa).
13In other words, Pa is transitive, antisymmetric (strict), and total.
14This condition is earlier used by Blair (1988). See also Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012, 2013).
15The interpretation is that agent a can definitely not work for/hire more than qa agents from the
other side of the problem. Note that for each q′
a
≥ |Sa|, [S ⊆ Sa with |S| > q′a implies ∅Pa S] is
vacuously true. Hence, qa ≤ |Sa|.
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Loosely speaking, the agents in F ′∪W ′ are strictly better off by establishing new part-
nerships only among themselves and possibly breaking up some existing partnerships.
A match is stable at P if it is not blocked by any agent or any set of firms and workers
at P . Let Σ(P ) denote the set of stable matches at P .
Remark 1. Note that when F ′ = {f} is a singleton and W ′ 6= ∅, blocking by F ′ ∪W ′
is equivalent to the following two conditions: (1) for each w ∈ W ′, f /∈ µ(w) and
f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ {f}, Pw) and (2) W
′ ⊆ Ch(µ(f) ∪W ′, Pf). In one-to-one matching, the
standard definition of stability of a match requires that neither an individual agent nor
a set F ′ ∪W ′ with |F ′| = 1 and |W ′| = 1 blocks the match. This is usually referred
as pairwise stability. In many-to-one matching, the definition of stability of a match
eliminates blocking by agents or by sets of firms and workers F ′ ∪W ′ with |F ′| = 1
and |W ′| ≥ 1. This is referred as many-to-one stability. Clearly, stability implies
many-to-one stability and many-to-one stability implies pairwise stability. ⋄
Remark 2. For later reference we note that any a ∈ A with µ(a) = Ch(Sa, Pa) cannot
be part of a blocking set. ⋄
Remark 3. Since unacceptable sets of partners cannot be part of a stable match, it is
sufficient to describe each agent’s ranking of acceptable sets of possible partners. For
instance,
Pf : {w1, w2}, {w1}, {w3}, {w2}, ∅
indicates that {w1, w2}Pf {w1}Pf {w3}Pf {w2}Pf ∅ and that all other sets of possible
partners are not acceptable to f . ⋄
Unless explicitly noticed otherwise, we make the following (standard) assumption on
each agent a’s preferences Pa.
Substitutability:
For each b, c ∈ S ⊆ Sa with b 6= c, [ b ∈ Ch(S, Pa) =⇒ b ∈ Ch(S\{c}, Pa) ].
Remark 4. For each profile of substitutable preferences P , Σ(P ) is non-empty (see,
e.g., Roth, 1984a, Theorem 1).16 Moreover, stability coincides with many-to-one sta-
bility and pairwise stability (Hatfield and Kominers, 2012a, Proposition 1).17,18 ⋄
It follows from Remark 4 that without loss of generality we can focus on pairwise sta-
bility, i.e., only consider possible blockings by individual agents and firm-worker pairs.
In particular, the terms ‘stability’ and ‘pairwise stability’ can be employed interchange-
ably.19
16Mart´ınez et al. (2004b) provided an algorithm to calculate all stable matchings when preferences
are substitutable.
17We thank a referee for pointing us to Proposition 1 in Hatfield and Kominers (2012a).
18Unlike in many-to-one matching with substitutable preferences, pairwise stability is not equivalent
to core-stability in many-to-many matching. Indeed, no logical relation exists between the two concepts
(Blair, 1988).
19The only exception is Proposition 1 since there one of the preference relations may not satisfy
substitutability.
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Theorem 2 in Roth (1984a) shows that there is a firm-optimal stable match µF
(which all firms find at least as desirable as any other stable match), and likewise a
worker-optimal stable match µW . In fact, the set of stable matches satisfies the following
properties which will be key in the proof of our first main result.
Theorem 1 (Roth, 1984a, Theorem 2). Let P be substitutable. Let µ ∈ Σ(P ). For
each f ∈ F and each w ∈ W ,
(i). Ch(µF (f) ∪ µ(f), Pf) = µF (f);
(ii). Ch(µW (w) ∪ µ(w), Pw) = µW (w).
3 Preference Domains
The matching literature has studied the following preference domains. Let a ∈ A.
Responsiveness:20,21
For each S ⊆ Sa with |S| < qa and for each b, c ∈ (Sa\S) ∪ {∅},
[ b Pa c ⇐⇒ (S ∪ {b}) Pa (S ∪ {c}) ].
Separability:22
For each S ⊆ Sa with |S| < qa and for each b ∈ Sa\S, [b Pa ∅ ⇐⇒ (S ∪ {b}) Pa S].
Cardinal monotonicity:23
For each pair S ′, S ⊆ Sa, [S
′ ⊆ S =⇒ |Ch(S ′, Pa)| ≤ |Ch(S, Pa)| ].
Quota-filling:24
Pa is substitutable and for each S ⊆ Sa with |S| ≥ ka ≡ max{|Ch(T, Pa)| : T ⊆ Sa},
|Ch(S, Pa)| = ka.
We introduce a new preference domain by relaxing separability in the following way.
Weak separability:
For each S ⊆ Sa with |S| < qa and Ch(S, Pa) = S, and for each b ∈ Sa\S,
[ b Pa ∅ =⇒ (S ∪ {b}) Pa S ].
Next, we give an example of a type of preference relations that is captured by
relaxing separability to weak separability.
Example 1. (Substitutable and weakly separable but not separable.)
The following substitutable preference relation Pf satisfies weak separability but not
separability:
Pf : {w1, w2}, {w1}, {w1, w3}, {w1, w2, w3}, {w2}, ∅. (2)
One can think of the preferences in (2) as obtained from some production function.
Workers w1 and w2 are ‘productive’ workers (as individuals and as a group), but worker
w3 is a nuisance that especially wreaks havoc on the productive workers’ synergy. ⋄
20Responsiveness was introduced by Roth (1985).
21With a slight abuse of notation we sometimes write x for a singleton {x}.
22Separability was introduced by Mart´ınez et al. (2000).
23Cardinal monotonicity was introduced by Alkan (2002).
24Quota-filling was introduced by Alkan (2001). Note that here we do explicitly mention substi-
tutability, since unlike the other preference domains mentioned in this section, it is an integral part of
the definition. Also note that ka ≤ qa and possibly ka 6= qa.
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Figure 1 depicts all inclusion relations among the preference domains. For instance,
responsiveness implies separability, cardinal monotonicity, and substitutability, but not
quota-filling. The inclusion relations follow from Lemmas 1, 3, and 4 below. For each
of the 13 numbered nodes in Figure 1 we provide in Example 2 a preference relation
that pertains to the associated subdomain.
7 8
substitutable
651 2
3
4
9
10
11 12 13
separable quota
fillingresponsive
weakly
separable
cardinally
monotonic
Figure 1: Inclusion relations among preference domains. Note: the domain of
• responsive preferences is depicted by the circle in the center;
• quota-filling preferences is depicted by the rectangle with vertical lines;
• separable preferences is depicted by the largest shaded area (which includes the
circle).
Lemma 1. Let a ∈ A.
(i). If Pa is responsive, then it is substitutable.
(ii). If Pa is responsive, then it is separable.
(iii). If Pa is separable, then it is weakly separable.
(iv). If Pa is quota-filling, then it is substitutable.
Proof. Item (i) is well-known (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, p.173). Items (ii)
and (iii) are immediate. Item (iv) holds by definition of quota-filling.
Lemma 2. Let a ∈ A. Assume Pa is quota-filling. Then, for each S ⊆ Sa with |S| ≤ ka,
Ch(S, Pa) = S.
Proof. If |S| = ka, then since Pa is quota-filling, Ch(S, Pa) = S. Let |S| < ka. Suppose
Ch(S, Pa) 6= S. Then, Ch(S, Pa) ( S. Let s ∈ S\Ch(S, Pa). By definition of ka there
exists K ⊆ Sa such that K ⊇ S and |K| = ka. By quota-filling, Ch(K,Pa) = K. So,
s ∈ Ch(K,Pa). By Lemma 1(iv), s ∈ Ch(S, Pa), which is a contradiction.
The third lemma will also be useful to prove our first main result in Section 4.
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Lemma 3. Let a ∈ A.
(i). If Pa is substitutable and weakly separable, then it is cardinally monotonic.
(ii). If Pa is separable, then it is cardinally monotonic.
(iii). If Pa is quota-filling, then it is cardinally monotonic.
Proof. Let Pa violate cardinal monotonicity. Let S
′, S ⊆ Sa be such that S
′ ⊆ S.
Suppose that |Ch(S ′, Pa)| > |Ch(S, Pa)|. Then, Ch(S
′, Pa) \Ch(S, Pa) 6= ∅. Let s
′ ∈
Ch(S ′, Pa) \Ch(S, Pa). Note s
′ ∈ Ch(S ′, Pa) ⊆ S
′ ⊆ S.
(i). Let Pa satisfy weak separability. We show that it violates substitutability. Since s
′ ∈
S, it follows from the definition of Ch that Ch(S, Pa) Pa (Ch(S, Pa)∪ {s
′}). Then, from
|Ch(S, Pa)| < |Ch(S
′, Pa)| ≤ qa, Ch(Ch(S, Pa), Pa) = Ch(S, Pa), and weak separability,
it follows that ∅ Pa s
′. Thus, s′ ∈ Ch(S ′, Pa) but Ch({s
′}, Pa) 6= {s
′}. Hence, Pa violates
substitutability.
(ii). Suppose s′ Pa ∅. Note that |Ch(S, Pa)| < qa and Ch(S, Pa)Pa (Ch(S, Pa) ∪ {s
′}).
Then, Pa violates separability. Suppose now that ∅Pa s
′. Note that |Ch(S ′, Pa)\{s
′}| <
qa and Ch(S
′, Pa)Pa (Ch(S
′, Pa)\{s
′}). Then, Pa violates separability.
(iii). Note that |Ch(S, Pa)| < |Ch(S
′, Pa)| ≤ ka. Suppose that |S| ≥ ka. Then, Pa is
not quota-filling. Suppose now that |S| < ka. Since s
′ ∈ S and s′ /∈ Ch(S, Pa), we have
Ch(S, Pa) ( S. Hence, by Lemma 2, Pa is not quota-filling.
Lemma 4. Let a ∈ A. If Pa is quota-filling and weakly separable, then it is separable.
Proof. If for all S ⊆ Sa, Ch(S, Pa) = ∅, then qa = 0 and separability is satisfied trivially.
Suppose for some S ⊆ Sa, Ch(S, Pa) 6= ∅. Then, ka ≥ 1. Let S ⊆ Sa with |S| < qa. Let
b ∈ Sa\S.
Suppose that (S ∪ {b})Pa S. From Lemma 2, Ch({b}, Pa) = {b}. Thus, b Pa ∅.
Suppose now that b Pa ∅. It is sufficient to show that Ch(S, Pa) = S. (Because then,
by weak separability, (S ∪ {b})Pa S.) Assume Ch(S, Pa) 6= S. Then, Ch(S, Pa) ( S.
Let K = Ch(S, Pa). Note that K = Ch(K,Pa) and |K| < |S| < qa. Let s ∈ S\K. From
Lemma 2 and ka ≥ 1, it follows that Ch({s}, Pa) = {s}. Thus, s Pa ∅. Then, from weak
separability, (K ∪ {s})PaK, which contradicts Ch(S, Pa) = K.
Finally, for each ‘non-empty area’ in Figure 1 it is not difficult to construct prefer-
ences that are indeed in the associated domains (and not in the other domains).
Example 2. For each of the 13 numbered nodes in Figure 1 we provide, without loss
of generality, a preference relation Pf of a firm f such that Pf pertains (only) to the
associated domains.
1. {w1, w2}, {w3, w4}, {w1, w3}, {w1, w4}, {w2, w3}, {w2, w4}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4}, ∅.
2. {w1, w2}, {w1, w3}, {w1, w4}, {w2, w3}, {w3, w4}, {w2, w4}, {w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4}, ∅
and there is at least one other worker, say w5.
3. {w1, w2}, {w1}, {w2}, ∅, {w1, w2, w3}, {w1, w3}, {w2, w3}, {w3}
and there are no other workers.
4. {w1, w2}, {w1}, {w2}, ∅
and there are no other workers.
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5. {w1, w2}, {w1, w3}, {w2, w3}, {w1, w4}, {w2, w4}, {w3, w4}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4}, {w1}, ∅
and there are no other workers.
6. {w1}, {w1, w2}, {w2}, ∅
and there are no other workers.
7. {w1, w4}, {w2, w3, w4}, {w4}, ∅.
8. {w1, w2, w3, w4}, {w1}, {w1, w2, w3}, ∅.
9. {w2, w3, w4}, {w1, w4}, {w2}, {w4}, ∅.
10. {w1, w2}, {w1}, {w1, w3}, {w1, w2, w3}, {w2}, ∅ (see Example 1).
11. {w1, w3}, {w1, w2, w3}, {w2, w3}, {w1}, {w3}, {w2}, ∅, {w1, w2}.
12. {w1}, {w2, w4}, {w2, w3}, {w4}, {w3}, {w2}, ∅.
13. {w1, w4}, {w2, w3, w4}, {w2}, {w4}, ∅.
⋄
4 Rural Hospital Theorem
The matching literature established the next two results for different domains of sub-
stitutable preferences in different models (one-to-one, many-to-one, and many-to-many
matching).
Rural Hospital Theorem. For each pair µ, µ′ ∈ Σ(P ) and each a ∈ A,
R1. |µ(a)| = |µ′(a)|;
R2. |µ(a)| < qa =⇒ µ(a) = µ
′(a).
It is easy to verify that R2 implies R1. For many-to-many matching, R1 holds for sub-
stitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences. We state this result for later reference.
Theorem 2 (Weak Rural Hospital Theorem. Alkan, 2002, Proposition 6). For
each profile P of substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences, each agent is as-
signed to the same number of partners across stable matches at P .
The literature has established R2 for
(i). many-to-one with substitutable and separable preferences (Mart´ınez et al., 2000);
(ii). many-to-many with responsive preferences (Alkan, 1999);
(iii). many-to-many with quota-filling and separable preferences (Alkan, 2001).25
There are no logical relations among the three results (i), (ii), and (iii). But our first
main result, which we present next, does subsume all three results. More precisely, we
show that R2 holds for the domain of substitutable and weakly separable preferences.
The proof uses the structural result stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 (Strong Rural Hospital Theorem). For each profile P of substitutable
and weakly separable preferences and each pair µ, µ′ ∈ Σ(P ), if an agent does not fill
her/its quota at µ, then she/it is assigned to the same set of partners at µ and µ′.
25See Appendix B for further details on Alkan’s (2001) result.
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Proof. From Theorem 2 and Lemma 3(i) it follows that R1 holds for P . Hence, it suffices
to show that for each f ∈ F with |µF (f)| < qf , µ(f) ⊆ µF (f). (Similar arguments can
be used to show that for each w ∈ W with |µW (w)| < qw, µ(w) ⊆ µW (w).)
Let f ∈ F with |µF (f)| < qf . Suppose µ(f) 6⊆ µF (f). Then, there is w ∈ µ(f)
with w 6∈ µF (f). Since µ ∈ Σ(P ), Ch(µ(f), Pf) = µ(f). Since w ∈ µ(f), it follows
from substitutability that Ch({w}, Pf) = {w}. So, wPf ∅. Hence, from |µF (f)| < qf ,
Ch(µF (f), Pf) = µF (f), and weak separability, it follows that
(µF (f) ∪ {w})Pf µF (f)
Th.1(i)
= Ch(µF (f) ∪ µ(f), Pf), (3)
which, since w ∈ µ(f), contradicts the consistency of Ch. More precisely, (3) shows that
(1) is violated for S = µF (f) ∪ µ(f) and T = µF (f) ∪ {w}. Hence, µ(f) ⊆ µF (f).
Corollary 1. Let Ψ be a solution concept for many-to-many matching such that for
each profile of substitutable preferences P , Ψ(P ) ⊆ Σ(P ) (see, e.g., Remark 5). Then,
for each profile of substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences P , the counterpart
of R1 defined for matches in Ψ(P ) holds. Similarly, for each profile of substitutable and
weakly separable preferences P , the counterpart of R2 defined for matches in Ψ(P )
holds.
Remark 5. Theorem 3 holds for stronger solution concepts, e.g., setwise stability (So-
tomayor, 1999), strong setwise stability, and weak setwise stability (Klaus and Walzl,
2009, Theorem 1). Moreover, since we assume substitutability for all our results but
Proposition 1, (pairwise) stability in fact coincides with some of these and other solu-
tion concepts as well (Echenique and Oviedo, 2006, Section 6; Klaus and Walzl, 2009,
Theorem 2). ⋄
We complement Theorems 2 and 3 with two maximality results. Recall that we
assume throughout that preferences are substitutable. Let R be a property for pref-
erence profiles. A domain D of substitutable preferences is maximal for property R if
(m1) each profile that consists of preferences in D satisfies R and (m2) whenever some
agent’s preferences are not in D, there are preferences in D for all other agents such
that the resulting preference profile does not satisfy R. Formally, a domain D of
substitutable preferences is maximal for property R if
(m1). whenever for each a ∈ A, Pa ∈ D, preference profile (Pa)a∈A satisfies property R,
and
(m2). whenever for some a ∈ A, Pa 6∈ D, there are (Pb)b∈A\a such that for each b ∈ A\a,
Pb ∈ D, and preference profile (Pa)a∈A does not satisfy property R.
With respect to Theorem 2, we prove that cardinal monotonicity is maximal for
R1. In fact, we prove a stronger result: if some agent’s preferences are not cardinally
monotonic,26 then there are responsive preferences for the other agents such that R1
fails (Proposition 1).
26Also note that we do not assume that this agent’s preferences satisfy substitutability. Obviously,
this strengthens the maximality result and also implies that we cannot recur to pairwise stability as it
may no longer coincide with stability.
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Proposition 1 (Maximality of Weak Rural Hospital Theorem). Suppose |F |, |W |
≥ 2. Suppose some firm or some worker has preferences that are not cardinally mono-
tonic. Then, there are responsive preferences for the other agents such that R1 fails.
Thus, cardinal monotonicity is maximal for R1.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, Pf1 ∈ Pf1 violates cardinal monotonicity.
Then, for some S ′ ⊆ S ⊆W , |Ch(S ′, Pf1)| > |Ch(S, Pf1)|. Hence,
Ch(S ′, Pf1)\Ch(S, Pf1) 6= ∅. (4)
We first show that Ch(S, Pf1)\Ch(S
′, Pf1) 6= ∅. Assume otherwise. Then, Ch(S, Pf1) ⊆
Ch(S ′, Pf1). Since Ch(S
′, Pf1) ⊆ S
′, we have Ch(S, Pf1) ⊆ S
′. Hence, from (1),
Ch(S ′, Pf1) = Ch(S, Pf1), which contradicts |Ch(S
′, Pf1)| > |Ch(S, Pf1)|. So, indeed,
Ch(S, Pf1)\Ch(S
′, Pf1) 6= ∅. (5)
For the construction of a preference profile of the other agents, we introduce the
partition {WA,WB,WC} of the workers in Ch(S, Pf1) ∪ Ch(S
′, Pf1) by defining
WA ≡ Ch(S, Pf1) ∩ Ch(S
′, Pf1),
WB ≡ Ch(S, Pf1) \Ch(S
′, Pf1), and
WC ≡ Ch(S ′, Pf1) \Ch(S, Pf1).
From (5) and (4) it follows that WB 6= ∅ and WC 6= ∅, respectively. In particular,
|WC| ≥ 1. (It is possible that WA = ∅.) Figure 2 depicts the partition.
W
WB WA WC
Ch(S, Pf1)
Ch(S ′, Pf1)
Figure 2: The partition {WA,WB,WC} of the workers in Ch(S, Pf1) ∪ Ch(S
′, Pf1).
We choose the preferences of the agents distinct from f1 as follows. Since |F | ≥ 2,
we can fix some f2 ∈ F , f2 6= f1. Then, we choose the preferences of f2 and those of
any firm in F\{f1, f2} as follows.
• Pf2 is responsive with qf2 ≡ |W
C| and for each wC ∈ WC , each wB ∈ WB, and
each w ∈ W\(WB ∪WC),
{wC} Pf2 {w
B} Pf2 ∅ Pf2 {w};
• Pf : ∅ for each f ∈ F\{f1, f2}.
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Note that by responsiveness and construction of Pf2 ,
Ch(W,Pf2) =W
C .
The preferences of the workers are given by Table 1. In particular, each worker in
WA ∪WB ∪WC has quota 1 and any other worker has quota 0. Obviously, for each
a ∈ A\{f1}, Pa is responsive.
Workers
wA ∈ WA wB ∈ WB wC ∈ WC w ∈ W\(WA ∪WB ∪WC)
f1 f2 f1 ∅
∅ f1 f2
∅ ∅
Table 1: Preferences of the workers
To show that R1 fails for preference profile P we consider the two matches µ1 and
µ2 provided in Table 2. In Table 1, match µ1 is indicated by boldface font and match
µ2 by boxes.
f1 f2 f ∈ F\{f1, f2}
µ1 W
A ∪WC WB ∅
µ2 W
A ∪WB WC ∅
Table 2: Matches µ1 and µ2
From
|WA ∪WC | = |Ch(S ′, Pf1)| > |Ch(S, Pf1)| = |W
A ∪WB|, (6)
it follows that |µ1(f1)| 6= |µ2(f1)|. Therefore, to complete the proof that R1 fails for P ,
it suffices to show that µ1, µ2 ∈ Σ(P ).
We first show that µ1 ∈ Σ(P ). Since µ1(f1) = W
A ∪WC = Ch(S ′, Pf1), it follows
from (1) that Ch(µ1(f1), Pf1) = µ1(f1), i.e., µ1 is not blocked by f1. From (6) and the
fact that WA,WB, and WC are mutually disjoint sets, we have
|WC| > |WB|.
Hence, |µ1(f2)| = |W
B| < |WC| = qf2 . Then, by responsiveness of Pf2, Ch(µ1(f2), Pf2) =
µ1(f2) as well. One easily verifies that no other individual agent blocks µ1 either. In
fact, since each worker is matched to her most preferred subset of firms at µ1, it follows
from Remark 2 that no worker is part of a blocking set for µ1. Hence, µ1 ∈ Σ(P ).
Finally, we show that µ2 ∈ Σ(P ). Using similar arguments as before, it is easy to see
that no individual agent blocks µ2. Now, assume that a set of firms and workers F
′∪W ′
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with F ′,W ′ 6= ∅ blocks µ2. Since each f ∈ F\{f1} and each w ∈ W\(W
B ∪WC) is
matched to its/her most preferred subset of partners at µ2, it follows from Remark 2
that F ′ = {f1} and W
′ ⊆ (WB ∪WC).
From Remark 1, blocking by F ′ = {f1} and W
′ ⊆ (WB ∪ WC) is equivalent to
the following: (1∗) for each w ∈ W ′, f1 /∈ µ2(w) and f1 ∈ Ch(µ2(w) ∪ {f1}, Pw) and
(2∗) W ′ ⊆ Ch(µ2(f1) ∪W
′, Pf1).
From (2∗) and µ2(f1) =W
A ∪WB = Ch(S, Pf1),
W ′ ⊆ Ch([Ch(S, Pf1) ∪W
′], Pf1). (7)
By W ′ ⊆ (WB ∪WC), WB ⊆ µ2(f1) and (1
∗), we have W ′ ⊆ WC. From W ′ ⊆ WC
and WC ⊆ S ′ ⊆ S, it follows that W ′ ⊆ S. By Ch(S, Pf1) ⊆ S and W
′ ⊆ S, we have
[Ch(S, Pf1) ∪W
′] ⊆ S. Hence, from (1) with T = [Ch(S, Pf1) ∪W
′],
Ch([Ch(S, Pf1) ∪W
′], Pf1) = Ch(S, Pf1). (8)
By (7), (8) and W ′ ⊆ WC , we have WC ∩ Ch(S, Pf1) 6= ∅, which contradicts the
definition ofWC . Therefore, there is no set of firms and workers that blocks µ2. Hence,
µ2 ∈ Σ(P ).
Next, we complement Theorem 3 by proving that weak separability is maximal
for R2. In this case we also prove a stronger result: if some agent has substitutable
preferences that are not weakly separable, then there are responsive preferences for the
other agents such that R2 fails (Proposition 2).
Proposition 2 (Maximality of Strong Rural Hospital Theorem). Suppose |F |,
|W | ≥ 2. Suppose some firm or some worker has preferences that are substitutable but
not weakly separable. Then, there are responsive preferences for the other agents such
that R2 fails. Thus, weak separability is maximal for R2.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, Pf1 ∈ Pf1 satisfies substitutability but vi-
olates weak separability. Suppose that Pf1 violates cardinal monotonicity. Then, by
Proposition 1, there is a profile of responsive preferences for the other agents such that
R1 fails. Since R2 implies R1, R2 fails too.
Now suppose that Pf1 satisfies cardinal monotonicity. Since Pf1 violates weak sep-
arability, there are S ⊆ W and w1 /∈ S with |S| < qf1 , Ch(S, Pf1) = S, w1 Pf1 ∅, and
S Pf1 (S ∪ {w1}).
Case I: w1 ∈ Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1).
Since S Pf1 (S ∪ {w1}), we have Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) 6= (S ∪ {w1}). In particular, |Ch(S ∪
{w1}, Pf1)| ≤ |S|. On the other hand, by cardinal monotonicity, |Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1)| ≥
|Ch(S, Pf1)| = |S|. Hence, |Ch(S∪{w1}, Pf1)| = |S|. Note that w1 ∈ Ch(S∪{w1}, Pf1) ⊆
(S ∪ {w1}) and w1 /∈ S. Hence, by setting B = Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1), C = S, and b = w1
in Lemma 5 in Appendix A it follows that
|Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) \S| = |S \Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1)| = 1
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and Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1)\S = {w1}. For the construction of a preference profile of the
other agents, we first define
{w2} ≡ S \Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) and
WA ≡ S ∩ Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1).
Figure 3 provides a graphical summary.
W
WA
Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1)
S
w1
w2
Figure 3: The sets of workers S and Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) in Case I
Since |F | ≥ 2, we can fix some f2 ∈ F , f2 6= f1. Then, we choose the preferences
of the agents different from f1 as in Table 3. Obviously, for each a ∈ A\{f1}, Pa is
responsive.
Firms Workers
f2 f ∈ F\{f1, f2} w1 w2 w ∈ W
A w ∈ W\({w1, w2} ∪W
A)
w2 ∅ f2 f1 f1 ∅
w1 f1 f2 ∅
∅ ∅ ∅
Table 3: Preferences of the agents distinct from f1 in Case I
To show that R2 fails for preference profile P we consider the two matches µ1 and
µ2 in Table 4. In Table 3, match µ1 is indicated by boldface font and match µ2 by
boxes.
f1 f2 f ∈ F\{f1, f2}
µ1 S {w1} ∅
µ2 Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) {w2} ∅
Table 4: Matches µ1 and µ2 in Case I
We now complete the proof of Case I. Since |µ1(f1)| = |S| < qf1 and µ1(f1) 6= µ2(f1),
it only remains to prove that µ1, µ2 ∈ Σ(P ). By Remark 4, it suffices to show that no
individual agent nor firm-worker pair blocks µ1 or µ2.
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We first show that µ1 ∈ Σ(P ). By assumption, Ch(S, Pf1) = S. Hence, f1 does not
block µ1. One easily verifies that no other agent blocks µ1 either. In fact, since each
worker is matched to her most preferred subset of firms at µ1, no worker is part of a
blocking pair for µ1. Hence, µ1 ∈ Σ(P ).
Finally, we show that µ2 ∈ Σ(P ). Note that no agent blocks µ2. Now, assume that
a firm-worker pair (fˆ , wˆ) blocks µ2. Since each f ∈ F\{f1} is matched to its most
preferred subset of workers at µ2, it follows that fˆ = f1. The only worker w for which
f1 6∈ µ2(w) and f1 ∈ Ch(µ2(w) ∪ {f1}, Pw) is w = w2. Hence, by Remark 1, wˆ = w2.
Then, since (f1, w2) blocks µ2,
w2 ∈ Ch(µ2(f1) ∪ {w2}, Pf1). (9)
On the other hand, since Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) ⊆ µ2(f1)∪ {w2} ⊆ S ∪ {w1}, (1) applied to
µ2(f1) ∪ {w2} and S ∪ {w1} yields Ch(µ2(f1) ∪ {w2}, Pf1) = Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1). Since
w2 6∈ Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1), we have w2 6∈ Ch(µ2(f1) ∪ {w2}, Pf1), which contradicts (9).
Hence, there is no blocking pair for µ2. Hence, µ2 ∈ Σ(P ).
Case II: w1 /∈ Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1).
From Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) ⊆ S and (1) applied to S and S ∪ {w1},
Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) = Ch(S, Pf1) = S. (10)
Let S ′ ⊆ S be such that
(a) Ch(S ′ ∪ {w1}, Pf1) = S
′ ∪ {w1} and
(b) S ′ ( S ′′ ⊆ S =⇒ Ch(S ′′ ∪ {w1}, Pf1) 6= S
′′ ∪ {w1}.
Since w1 Pf1 ∅, we have Ch({w1}, Pf1) = {w1}. Hence, there exists a subset of S that
satisfies (a), namely the empty set. Hence, S ′ is well-defined. From w1 6∈ S and (10), it
follows that S ′ 6= S. Thus, S ′ ( S. This implies that S\S ′ 6= ∅. Let w2 ∈ S\S
′. Figure
4 depicts the sets S and S ′ together with w1 and w2.
W
S ′
S
w1
w2
Figure 4: The sets S and S ′ and workers w1 and w2 in Case II
From substitutability of Pf1 and Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) = S it follows that
Ch(S ′ ∪ {w2}, Pf1) = S
′ ∪ {w2}. (11)
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Next, we show that w1 /∈ Ch(S
′ ∪ {w1, w2}, Pf1). Assume by contradiction that
w1 ∈ Ch(S
′ ∪ {w1, w2}, Pf1). (12)
From substitutability of Pf1, Ch(S ∪ {w1}, Pf1) = S, and S
′ ∪ {w2} ⊆ S it follows that
S ′ ∪ {w2} ⊆ Ch(S
′ ∪ {w1, w2}, Pf1). (13)
Then, from Ch(S ′∪{w1, w2}, Pf1) ⊆ S
′∪{w1, w2}, (12), and (13) it follows that Ch(S
′∪
{w1, w2}, Pf1) = S
′ ∪ {w1, w2}, which is a contradiction to (b) with S
′′ = S ′ ∪ {w2}.
Hence,
w1 6∈ Ch(S
′ ∪ {w1, w2}, Pf1). (14)
Since |F | ≥ 2, we can fix some f2 ∈ F , f2 6= f1. Then, we choose the preferences
of the agents different from f1 as in Table 5. Obviously, for each a ∈ A\{f1}, Pa is
responsive.
Firms Workers
f2 f ∈ F\{f1, f2} w1 w2 w ∈ S
′ w ∈ W\({w1, w2} ∪ S
′)
w1 ∅ f1 f2 f1 ∅
w2 f2 f1 ∅
∅ ∅ ∅
Table 5: Preferences of the agents distinct from f1 in Case II
To show that R2 fails for preference profile P we consider the two matches µ1 and
µ2 in Table 6. In Table 5, match µ1 is indicated by boldface font and match µ2 by
boxes.
f1 f2 f ∈ F\{f1, f2}
µ1 S
′ ∪ {w2} {w1} ∅
µ2 S
′ ∪ {w1} {w2} ∅
Table 6: Matches µ1 and µ2 in Case II
We now complete the proof of Case II. Since |µ1(f1)| = |S
′ ∪ {w2}| ≤ |S| < qf1
and µ1(f1) 6= µ2(f1), it only remains to prove that µ1, µ2 ∈ Σ(P ). By Remark 4 it is
sufficient to discard blocking by individual agents and firm-worker pairs.
We first show that µ1 ∈ Σ(P ). From (11), f1 does not block µ1. One easily verifies
that no other individual agent blocks µ1 either. Now, assume that a firm-worker pair
(fˆ , wˆ) blocks µ1. Since each f ∈ F\{f1} is matched to its most preferred subset of
workers at µ1, it follows that fˆ = f1. The only worker w for which f1 6∈ µ1(w) and
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f1 ∈ Ch(µ1(w)∪{f1}, Pw) is w = w1. Hence, by Remark 1, wˆ = w1. Then, since (f1, w1)
blocks µ1, we have w1 ∈ Ch(µ1(f1) ∪ {w1}, Pf1). Then, from µ1(f1) = S
′ ∪ {w2},
w1 ∈ Ch(S
′ ∪ {w1, w2}, Pf1),
which contradicts (14). Hence, there is no blocking pair for µ1. Hence, µ1 ∈ Σ(P ).
Finally, we show that µ2 ∈ Σ(P ). From (a), f1 does not block µ2. One easily verifies
that no other individual agent blocks µ2 either. In fact, since each worker is matched
to her most preferred subset of firms at µ2, no worker is part of a blocking pair for µ2.
Hence, µ2 ∈ Σ(P ).
We conclude with three remarks about Propositions 1 and 2.
Remark 6 (Cardinalities |F | and |W |). In Propositions 1 and 2 we assume that
|F |, |W | ≥ 2. If |F | = 1 or |W | = 1, then the conclusions in Propositions 1 and 2
need not hold. To see this, suppose, without loss of generality, that |F | = 1 (the case
|W | = 1 is symmetric). Let f be the unique firm.
Consider Proposition 1.
• Suppose |W | ≥ 3. Let the firm’s preferences be given by Pf : {w1}, {w2, w3},
{w2}, ∅. Then, Pf is not cardinally monotonic. Consider any possible preferences
of the other agents (i.e., all workers). Since there is a unique firm, all workers’
preferences are responsive. Moreover, it is not difficult to prove that R1 does not
fail. Therefore, the conclusion in Proposition 1 that R1 fails is not true.
• Suppose |W | ≤ 2. Then, one can easily show that any possible preferences of
the firm and the worker(s) are cardinally monotonic. Hence, the assumption that
‘some firm or some worker has preferences that are not cardinally monotonic’ (in
Proposition 1) cannot be fulfilled.
Next, consider Proposition 2.
• Suppose |W | ≥ 2. Let the firm’s preferences be given by Pf : {w1}, {w2},
{w1, w2}, ∅. Then, Pf is substitutable but not weakly separable. Consider any
possible preferences of the other agents (i.e., all workers). Since there is a unique
firm, all workers’ preferences are responsive. Moreover, it is not difficult to prove
that R2 does not fail. Therefore, the conclusion in Proposition 2 that R2 fails is
not true.
• Suppose |W | ≤ 1. Then, any possible preferences of the firm and the worker are
weakly separable. Hence, the assumption that ‘some firm or some worker has
preferences that are not weakly separable’ (in Proposition 2) cannot be fulfilled.
⋄
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Remark 7 (Maximality for Many-to-One). In the proof of Propositions 1 and 2
we fix the preferences of a firm and construct preferences of the other agents. The
construction is such that all workers have a quota of at most 1. Hence, the proofs are
also effective for the many-to-one framework. Therefore, the two maximality results
also hold for the many-to-one framework. In fact, the restriction of Propositions 1 and
2 to the many-to-one framework are novel for that framework as well. ⋄
Remark 8 (Existing Maximality Results of the Weak Rural Hospital Theo-
rem). There exist two maximality results of the weak rural hospital theorem that are
related to Proposition 1: Hatfield and Milgrom (2005, Theorem 9) and Hatfield and
Kominers (2012b, Theorem 9). Below we discuss these related results and in particular
show that neither of them implies Proposition 1.
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) studied many-to-one matching with contracts. They
proved R1 for substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences (Theorem 8). More-
over, they showed that cardinal monotonicity is a maximal domain for R1. More
precisely, if some agent’s preferences violate cardinal monotonicity but do satisfy sub-
stitutability, then there are preferences with a quota of at most 1 for all other agents
such that R1 fails (Theorem 9). The latter result differs from our Proposition 1 in
two respects. First, in contrast to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005, Theorem 9), we do not
make nor need the assumption that preferences are substitutable. Second, in contrast
to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005, Theorem 9), in our construction (only) one of the other
agents has preferences with a quota larger than 1. Therefore, in the framework without
contracts, Proposition 1 does not imply nor is implied by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005,
Theorem 9).
In the many-to-many matching model of Hatfield and Kominers (2012b), agents
trade goods through contracts that specify a seller, a buyer, and terms of exchange. An
essential feature of their model is that an agent may be a buyer in some contracts while
a seller in some others. The restriction of Theorem 9 in Hatfield and Kominers (2012b)
to the two-sided many-to-many model without contracts boils down to the following. If
some agent’s preferences violate cardinal monotonicity but do satisfy substitutability,
then there are substitutable and cardinally monotonic preferences for the other agents
such that R1 fails. Proposition 1 is distinct from Theorem 9 in at least three respects.
First, Theorem 9 assumes that the set of contracts is exhaustive, i.e., any two agents
can be part of a contract. Clearly, exhaustiveness does not hold in two-sided models
such as ours, as the definition of a match does not permit partnerships between agents
on the same side of the market. Second, in each case in the proof of Theorem 9, the
failure of R1 for the agent whose preferences violate cardinal monotonicity relies on
the assumption that this agent’s preferences are substitutable. However, Proposition 1
does not make this assumption. Third, in contrast to Theorem 9, Proposition 1 shows
that R1 can even fail when the other agents’ preferences have a very simple structure
(i.e., they are responsive). In fact, the proof of Proposition 1 only requires that one of
the other agents has quota 2 (all other agents have a quota of at most 1). Therefore, in
the framework without contracts, Proposition 1 is not implied by Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005, Theorem 9). ⋄
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A Lemma for Proof of Proposition 2
Below we state and prove the lemma that is used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 5. Let B and C be sets such that |B| = |C| and for some b 6∈ C, b ∈ B ⊆
C ∪ {b}. Then, |B\C| = |C\B| = 1 and B\C = {b}.
Proof. Since B ⊆ C ∪ {b}, B\{b} ⊆ C. So, (B\{b})\C = ∅. Hence, since b ∈ B\C, we
have B\C = {b}. In particular, |B\C| = 1.
We now show that |C\B| = 1. Note that {B\C,C\B,B∩C} is a partition of B∪C.
Hence,
|B ∪ C| = |B\C|+ |C\B|+ |B ∩ C|. (15)
Since B ⊆ C ∪{b} and b ∈ B\C, we have B ∪C = C ∪{b} and B ∩C = B\{b}. Then,
equation (15) yields
|C ∪ {b}| = |B\C|+ |C\B|+ |B\{b}|. (16)
Given that |B\C| = 1, equation (16) can be written as
|C|+ 1 = 1 + |C\B|+ |B\{b}|.
So, |C| = |C\B|+ |B\{b}|. Or equivalently, |C| − |B\{b}| = |C\B|. Hence,
|C| − (|B| − 1) = |C\B|. (17)
From equation (17) and |B| = |C|, it follows that |C\B| = 1.
B Quota-filling Preferences
In this Appendix we discuss how Alkan (2001, Corollary 1) relates to R2. For conve-
nience, we first state and prove a lemma.
Lemma 6. Let a ∈ A. If Pa is quota-filling and separable, then qa = ka.
Proof. Suppose ka = 0. Then, a finds all sets of agents S ⊆ Sa unacceptable. Hence,
qa = 0. So, qa = ka.
Let ka ≥ 1. Suppose by contradiction that qa 6= ka. Then, since qa ≥ ka, we have
qa > ka. By definition of qa, there exists some S ⊆ Sa such that |S| = qa and S Pa ∅.
Let T = Ch(S, Pa). Since Pa is quota-filling and |S| ≥ ka, we have |T | = ka. Then,
since |S| = qa > ka = |T |, we have S\T 6= ∅. Let b ∈ S\T .
Suppose b Pa ∅. Then, from separability and |T | < qa, it follows that (T ∪{b})Pa T ,
which is in contradiction with T = Ch(S, Pa). Hence, ∅Pa b. Since ka ≥ 1, Lemma 2
yields Ch({b}, Pa) = {b}, which is in contradiction with ∅Pa b. Hence, qa = ka.
Corollary 1 in Alkan (2001) shows that for each profile of quota-filling preferences P
and each pair µ, µ′ ∈ Σ(P ),
R2∗. |µ(a)| < ka =⇒ µ(a) = µ
′(a).
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From Lemma 6 it follows that on the domain of quota-filling and separable preferences,
for each agent a, ka = qa, and hence R2
∗ coincides with R2. However, as item 6 in
Example 2 shows, if for some agent a, Pa is not separable, then possibly ka 6= qa. In
fact, the following example shows that in this case R2 does not necessarily hold.
Example 3. There are two firms and three workers and their preferences P are given
in Table 7. Obviously, for each a ∈ A\{f1}, Pa is quota-filling and separable. Also, Pf1
Firms Workers
f1 f2 w1 w2 w3
{w1, w2} w3 f2 f1 f1
{w1, w3} w1 f1 f2 f2
{w2, w3} w2 ∅ ∅ ∅
{w1, w2, w3} ∅
{w1}
{w2}
{w3}
∅
Table 7: Preferences in Example 3
is quota-filling but not separable.
Consider the two matches µ1 and µ2 in Table 8. In Table 7, match µ1 is indicated
by boldface font and match µ2 by boxes. One easily verifies that µ1 and µ2 are stable
f1 f2
µ1 {w1, w2} {w3}
µ2 {w2, w3} {w1}
Table 8: Matches µ1 and µ2 in Example 3
at P . Notice that qf1 = 3, |µ1(f1)| = |µ2(f1)|, and µ1(f1) 6= µ2(f1). Hence, R2 does not
hold for P . ⋄
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